Trying a switch to tal@lemmy.today, at least for a while, due to recent kbin.social stability problems and to help spread load.

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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: June 13th, 2023

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  • Reddit had the ability to have a per-subreddit wiki. I never dug into it on the moderator side, but it was useful for some things like setting up pages with subreddit rules and the like. I think that moderators had some level of control over it, at least to allow non-moderator edits or not, maybe on a per-page basis.

    That could be a useful option for communities; I think that in general, there is more utility for per-community than per-instance wiki spaces, though I know that you admin a server with one major community which you also moderate, so in your case, there may not be much difference.

    I don’t know how amenable django-wiki is to partitioning things up like that, though.

    EDIT: https://www.reddit.com/wiki/wiki/ has a brief summary.





  • Starting with… what navy.

    My guess is that it probably still exists as an institution. It sounds like the Neptune missiles are their thing, so they’re probably the ones firing those. They may not be at that hotel, but…

    EDIT: I’d also give good odds that they’re the guys doing the USV attacks.

    If Ukrainian forces can make it to the shores of the Sea of Azov, my guess is that the Ukrainian Navy’s role is going to get considerably more interesting, as I expect that they’ll be responsible for doing the cutting of Russian supply lines over water to Crimea. As things stand, they can maybe interdict vessels in the Black Sea, but not the Sea of Azov, so they can’t really fully cut off supply over water.




  • [continued from parent]

    There’s a name given to a limited-duration effect seen in the US where, under certain conditions, US Presidents get a short-term spike in popularity during military conflicts. That’s not a very long-lasting effect, but it is quite dramatic in strength – if the public considers the country to be at risk, they will tend to put aside political differences and support the current leadership.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rally_'round_the_flag_effect

    The rally 'round the flag effect (or syndrome) is a concept used in political science and international relations to explain increased short-run popular support of a country’s government or political leaders during periods of international crisis or war.[1] Because the effect can reduce criticism of governmental policies, it can be seen as a factor of diversionary foreign policy.[1]

    But suppose that instead of a short-term effect because of a temporary conflict, you can have a country – from a domestic political standpoint, at any rate, no or little actual fighting required – staying in a permanent, wartime crisis mode. Then maybe you can leverage the effect on an ongoing basis. North Korea has, rarely, had limited and small conflicts with South Korea subsequent to the Korean War. If it did initiate a second annexation attempt, it would likely go poorly for North Korea. It is not likely, as things stand, to initiate a second attempt. But by keeping the country politically at a state of war…well, you can still maintain control when, by most respects, North Korea’s situation isn’t all that great for the typical person in North Korea. The Kim dynasty is quite politically-repressive, and the country has about three percent the per-capita GDP of South Korea. That’s ordinarily a situation where people are likely going to ask some difficult questions of the government. But as long as, from a political standpoint, the country is at war…shrugs

    Russia in 2023 is more-politically-repressive than it was, say, ten years back, but it’s also still no North Korea. But I have wondered whether it might be the case that the Kremlin winds up trying to leverage some of the same mechanisms that the Kim dynasty does.


  • Maybe. I don’t think that the war is necessarily the main concern.

    Hitler consumed all of his fighting-age men, and then had to use what he had left, which were the youth and elderly. That’s not the situation in the Russo-Ukrainian War, not by a long shot.

    The Kremlin is very probably concerned about the political effects of mobilization. Mobilization was delayed well past the point where it was probably militarily-advisory, and the Kremlin was willing to pay a lot to bring in contract soldiers to try to limit mobilization. That’s not a government that’s exhausted all available manpower and is looking for stop-gap measures to try to convert more people into military power. It’s a state that’s worried about what the conflict might do to the government politically.

    The Kim dynasty stayed in power in North Korea for a long time by keeping the country in a constant state of alert and militarizing society.

    https://nationalinterest.org/blog/korea-watch/perpetual-struggle-why-korean-war-did-not-end-north-korea-164209

    The Political Motives of Sustaining a Perpetual War

    While often—yet mistakenly—called the forgotten war, to both North and South Koreans the Korean War is not some distant memory, but has become an integral part of their respective national identity. In North Korea, the discourse on the Korean War is among the most important meta-narratives that make use of the country’s foundational history and recurring historical analogies to explain and legitimize contemporary their government. According to this narrative, the Korean War did not end in 1953 and while the nature of this conflict changed over time, the logic of a perpetual national emergency has been kept intact.

    Even in times of political détente, the discursive construction of a permanent threat by and perpetual war with the United States was largely upheld in the domestic discourse. Described as a “diplomatic war” in many North Korean sources, diplomacy with America is described as continuation of war by other means. Understanding the reason behind this logic requires us to acknowledge that, to the decisionmakers in Pyongyang, sustaining a state of perpetual war and supreme emergency serves a number of tangible political functions. For instance, most notably to strengthen collective identity by provoking and allaying anxiety to maintain quiescence and de-legitimizing dissent. As the identity of the Self is experienced and apprehended more strongly in times of increased threats and the existence of an external enemy, these notions are frequently used to build internal unity and coherency.

    Selig Harrison rightly stated that North Korea’s “permanent siege mentality” has not only helped bonding the society (and the political class) together, but that the permanent state of supreme emergency is also a powerful political strategy that helped solidify the rule of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and now Kim Jong-un. As the leader is basically equated with the sovereignty and independence of the North Korean state and the protection of the Korean nation, the production of an identity as a warring nation reinforces a strong need to preserve the absolute nature of its leader.

    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Songun

    Songun is the “military-first” policy of North Korea, prioritizing the Korean People’s Army in the affairs of state and allocation of resources. “Military-first” as a principle guides political and economic life in North Korea, with “military-first politics” dominating the political system; “a line of military-first economic construction” acting as an economic system; and “military-first ideology” serving as the guiding ideology.

    Songun elevates the Korean People’s Army within North Korea as an organization and as a state function, granting it the primary position in the North Korean government and society. It guides domestic policy and international interactions.[1] It is the framework for the government, designating the military as the “supreme repository of power”. The government grants the Korean People’s Army the highest economic and resource-allocation priority and positions it as the model for society to emulate.[2] Songun is also the ideological concept behind a shift in policies since 1994 which emphasize the people’s military over all other aspects of state and society.

    [continued in child]



  • I broadly agree that “cloud” has an awful lot of marketing fluff to it, as with many previous buzzwords in information technology.

    However, I also think that there was legitimately a shift from a point in time where one got a physical box assigned to them to the point where VPSes started being a thing to something like AWS. A user really did become increasingly-decoupled from the actual physical hardware.

    With a physical server, I care about the actual physical aspects of the machine.

    With a VPS, I still have “a VPS”. It’s virtualized, yeah, but I don’t normally deal with them dynamically.

    With something like AWS, I’m thinking more in terms of spinning up and spinning down instances when needed.

    I think that it’s reasonable to want to describe that increasing abstraction in some way.

    Is it a fundamental game-changer? In general, I don’t think so. But was there a shift? Yeah, I think so.

    And there might legitimately be some companies for which that is a game-changer, where the cost-efficiencies of being able to scale up dynamically to handle peak load on a service are so important that it permits their service to be viable at all.



  • I mean, scrolling down that list, those all make sense.

    I’m not arguing that Google should have kept them going.

    But I think that it might be fair to say that Google did start a number of projects and then cancel them – even if sensibly – and that for people who start to rely on them, that’s frustrating.

    In some cases, like with Google Labs stuff, it was very explicit that anything there was experimental and not something that Google was committing to. If one relied on it, well, that’s kind of their fault.